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ANOTHER VIEW OF THE PUBLIC RIGHT TO FISH ±
AND THE QUESTION OF REGULATION OR OWNERSHIP
Are there limitations on fishing methods that may damage the
benthic fauna or flora?
PETER SCOTT
Partner, Parkinson Wright LLP, Worcester
Tom Appleby's article `Damage by fishing in the UK's
Lyme Bay ± A problem of regulation or ownership?'1 is
an interesting analysis, albeit from a somewhat
partisan standpoint, of the scope that exists for
state bodies to take measures to limit damage to
benthic fauna or flora of nature conservation interest
caused by a particular method of fishing, and by
fishing in general. This article represents an alternative
viewpoint.
Appleby argues that there are intrinsic common law
limitations to the right to fish, irrespective of statutory
prohibitions or restrictions on the public right. The
implications of this are that the exercise or purported
exercise of the public right to fish by particular
methods may constitute a civil tort actionable by the
owner of the seabed; that where that owner is a state
body, there may be a specific obligation to take action
against the tortfeasors, and the existence of the civil
tort may then render other provisions of criminal law
applicable against the tortfeasor.
Appleby specifically suggests, by analogy with private
law doctrines in relation to easements and profits aÁ
prendre, that there can be exceedence of the public
right. He also discusses the possibility that collateral
environmental damage from fishing operations may be
considered ancillary to the public right of fishery.
The public right of fishing is Appleby's central concern.
He argues in this article, and indeed elsewhere that, on
the basis of the Irish case of Whelan v Hewson2 and
the Canadian case in relation to boundaries Attorney
General for Canada v Attorney General for Quebec:3
`Under the public right, fishing is limited to what is
legal, reasonable and to activities which do not
interfere with the rights of the owner of the `̀ solum''
or seabed'. Appleby then prays in aid reasonableness
in the interpretation of what is legal and activities
interfering with the rights of the owner of the
foreshore or fundus.
WHELAN v HEWSON
The emphasis Appleby places on Whelan v Hewson
both in this article and in his submission to the
European Commission justifies particular considera-
tion of the extent to which this authority, if accepted as
persuasive in the English and Welsh courts, supports
the proposition of a qualified right of public fishery.
The decision is of particular interest to those practising
in areas involving pollution and other activities
injurious to fisheries because of the engagement of
the special damage rule of public nuisance. This is
controversial in common law jurisdictions: authorities
in Canada and Australia suggest that those who
exercise the public right of fishery cannot maintain
an action in nuisance because, fishing qua members of
the public, their loss is in theory no different from that
of other persons. Other Canadian and US authorities
have not followed this principle in relation to inter-
ferences with the rights of common fishery and of
navigation.
Whelan v Hewson happened to uphold the right of
action of a person exercising the public right of fishery
in a licensed fishery; ie where the class of persons who
could exercise the right of fishery was artificially
restricted by statute through a licensing system.
However, the judgments do not expressly determine
this point, and the judgment of the Chief Baron relied
upon the suffering of special damage in the exercise of
the public right.
It would be more precise to state that the appellate
court did not disturb the action of the trial judge, who
allowed the question of particular and individual
damage to be decided by the jury. Consequently the
plaintiff was determined by the jury to be able to
maintain an action.
The defendant, interestingly, was purporting to exer-
cise the public right of fishery but in an area where the
exercise of the public right was prohibited, except
where it was carried on under a right of several, or
private, fishery. It was held that the defendant's fishing
operations were illegal, not because of the nature of
the nets used but because he was fishing in an area
prohibited under the fisheries code. Therefore when
Appleby advances on the authority of Whelan v
Hewson the view that: `Under the public right, fishing
is limited to what is legal, [and] reasonable . . .', it would
1 (2007) 18 WL 30. The full text of this article is available on
www.lawtext.com.
2 Whelan v Hewson [1872] IR VI 283.
3 Attorney General for Canada v Attorney General for Quebec (1921)
56 DLR 358.
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seem the first part of the proposition is effectively a
tautology, and the second is not supported by the
particular authority cited.
ATTORNEY-GENERAL FOR CANADA v
ATTORNEY-GENERAL FOR QUEBEC
In Attorney-General for Canada v Attorney-General for
Quebec, the issues principally concerned the extent to
which the particular principles of French law, which
constitutes the common law of Quebec, were applic-
able in relation to fisheries in place of the English
common law, and the relationship between the
Dominion and provincial authorities in the grant of
fisheries. The only relevance of the judgment to the
issue of the conflict between the right of fishery and
rights associated with the soil refer to the rights of the
owner of soil to install and/or licence fixed engines, ie
fishing structures.
As to the rights of the owner of the soil, which in
Appleby's view conflict with the manner of the
exercise of the public right, the judgment of the court
acknowledges:
It is true that the public right of fishing in tidal waters does
not extend to a right to fix to the solum kiddles, weirs or
other engines of the kind. That is because the solum is not
vested in the public, but may be so in either the Crown or
private owners.
In so far as the soil is vested in the Crown in right of the
Province, the Government of the Province has exclusive
power to grant the right to affix engines to the solum, so
far as such engines and the affixing of them do not
interfere with the right of the public to fish, or prevent the
regulation of the right of fishing by private persons
without the aid of such engines.
The last comments, expressed in the actual decision
on the case, in fact acknowledge the opposite
principle to that propounded by Appleby, namely that
the rights of the owner of the soil may not be
exercised in such a way as to interfere with the right
of the public to fish.
Neither of the authorities upon whom Appleby
principally relies in support of his thesis of the
qualified right to fish seems to support the qualifica-
tions for which he argues. Consequently, it is appro-
priate to turn the question on its head, and to consider
the issues from the perspective of the fisheries
comprised in the public right.
A FISH, AND HOW IT MAY BE TAKEN
The traditional view of the public right of fishery is
based on the idea that all the king's subjects have an
unlimited common law right to take fish as far as the
tide flows. The term `fish' has a fairly settled meaning,
which includes fin fish, crustaceans and molluscs. It
does not include aquatic mammals or worms, hence
the very limited justification held to exist in Anderson
v Alnwick DC for the right for an individual to take
worms for personal use as bait in fishing.
The right to take is, in technological terms, unqualified
at common law, and is understood to mean by any
mobile means employed to capture fish, or to make
them more amenable to capture. Fishing techniques
using mobile equipment (gears) have developed over
centuries, and more recently over decades and even
during the last few years. At no point has there been a
requirement for the manner of the exercise of the right
to be evidenced by custom or long user, and the
proposition that the nature of this exercise of the
public right can be qualified according to the manner
of its exercise at any particular time is not supported
by any authority. The analogy Appleby seeks to draw
with the prescriptive acquisition of profits-aÁ -prendre is
not appropriate. If anything, the analogy would be
with public rights of way. Once the public has a
vehicular right of way, the intensity of its use and the
weight or speed of vehicles able to use it are unlimited
by common law. The invention of the first steam
carriages and then vehicles powered by internal
combustion engines did not give rise to any exceed-
ence of the public right.
ACCESS AND THE RIGHTS OF THE OWNER OF
THE SOIL
A fisherman needs to get to a position from which fish
can be taken. This may be achieved by the right of
navigation of vessels, by swimming in the waters
(interestingly, seemingly without the benefit of any
right whatsoever), or by proceeding across the fore-
shore on foot (which is accepted as ancillary to the
public right of fishery). The use of land-based vehicles
upon the foreshore to access a fishery or to remove
fish taken from it is not ancillary to the public right,
although various attempts have been made to license
such vehicular use as ancillary. The use of amphibious
vehicles which can be grounded as ancillary to the
right of navigation for the more effective exploitation
of a fishery gives rise to more interesting questions.
Such vehicles are frequently used in France in
connection with licensed mollusc culture.
Vehicular access to a fishery forms one of the
purported ancillary aspects of fishing which does
constitute an infringement of the rights of the owner
of the soil, unless the access is with the owner's
consent. It may also be a criminal offence under the
Road Traffic Act 1964 s 34.
Other infringements of the rights of the owner can
be expressed thus: no right is ancillary to the right
of fishery if its continuation would entail, by long
user, the acquisition of new rights against the owner of
the soil. The installation of nets attached to fixed
posts, or fixed engines, has always been a trespass
against the owner of the soil unless carried out with
consent, and for this reason the general proposition
stated above is related to mobile fishing equipment
(gear).
By the same token, although it is argued to be ancillary
to the right to fish, laying down fish taken into
possession through capture on the foreshore or
fundus has the capacity through long user of establish-
ing rights against the owner of the soil, and therefore
is not part of the public right.
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THE LIMITS WITHIN WHICH THE PUBLIC RIGHT
OF FISHERY CAN BE EXERCISED
Apart from these issues, the public right of fishery is to
take the fish within the boundaries of the tidal zone
irrespective of their physical location in the vertical
dimension relative to the body of water, or their
degree of attachment to any physical object. On the
one hand there is little doubt that a fisherman can take
a fish which at the moment of capture is not in the
water ± for example jumping out of it ± but if it is in the
area between the tidal waters and the benthos,
interesting questions arise which are probably best
illustrated by molluscan fisheries.
Mussels and oysters attach themselves by byssus
threads to rocks or other substrates or to posts or
the shells of other creatures. They can be fished by
breaking or cutting them off or by the use of a shallow
dredge basket which cuts into the fundus to a small
distance. In most cases the use of such a device has
been accepted as not being a trawl for the purposes of
sea fishery committee gear byelaw approvals.
Cockles, however, are generally found deeper in the
sediment, and can be gathered by hand using various
means, for example raking or dredging. In some areas
the use of jumbos or tables which are rocked on the
sand encourages the cockles to come to the surface
where they can be gathered more easily.
In the Waddensee case,4 exploitation of a cockle
fishery was compared by the court with mechanical
exploitation of minerals in the bed of the sea. There is
no question that fishing for cockles by hydraulic dredge
from fishing vessels is at common law a lawful exercise
of the right of public fishery. The operation of such a
dredge involves extracting part of the seabed together
with the fish contained in it, and then screening out
the smaller physical components, together with under-
sized cockles. Larger rock fragments are retained on
the vessel until the screen has been cleared.
Burrowing razor clam species such as ensis are found
even deeper and can be gathered from their burrows
by the use of hydraulic dredges. Alternatively, they can
be persuaded to leave their burrows by the application
of salt, as is traditional in northern parts of the United
Kingdom, or by a more recently developed technique
using relatively weak electrical fields. They are then
gathered by divers, which constitutes the fishing
operation in the strict sense.
Scallop dredging, on which Appleby particularly
focuses in the context of the conservation of features
of nature conservation interest in Lyme Bay, Dorset,
does not involve the penetration of the gear into the
benthos to anything like the same extent as does
fishing for other species. Scallops do not burrow into
the seabed, nor attach themselves to the fundus in the
same way as mussels and oysters. The particular
concerns with regard to scallop dredging centre on
the physical impact of the equipment used if it collides
with hard features of interest especially, in the case of
Lyme Bay, reefs. However, in terms of the appropria-
tion to the fisherman of physical components of the
substrate, this technique pales in comparison with the
operation of hydraulic dredges.
The response so far in the United Kingdom has been
to prohibit under statutory powers the use of such
dredge gear in relation to particular reef areas as and
when particular concerns arise. This is a more robust
approach in terms of protecting specific areas of
nature conservation interest than Appleby's discussion
of the potential application of s 9(1) of the Wildlife and
Countryside Act 1981. As Appleby correctly points out,
there is a specific defence under s 10(3)(c), although
this has now been eroded in relation to European
protected species to which Annex IV of the Habitats
Directive applies.
The fact that scallops can be, and frequently are,
gathered by divers does not affect the lawfulness of
other techniques to take them, any more than the
potential for divers to gather razor clams makes other
techniques to take razor clams unlawful, regardless of
the questions which have been raised in relation to the
green credentials of diving for scallops. For this reason
there appears little prospect of establishing that the
s 10 defence does not apply to the exercise of the
public right of fishery unless the exercise of that right
is restrained by specific statutory provision.
The rights of the owner of the fundus are subject to
the rights of the public in relation to the fishery, and
therefore the exercise of the right of fishery, by
whatever technique, is not an interference with the
owners' rights. Indeed, the actions or defaults of the
owner of the soil have the potential to be actionable in
principle at the instance of those who exercise the
right of common fishery. Illustrations of that can be
found in the installation of fixed moorings. These are
not authorised under the public right of navigation. If
the owner installs or permits to be installed fixed
moorings in such a way as to interfere with the
exercise of a right of fishery in the waters immediately
above, then that can constitute a nuisance, as well as
being actionable, for example, under the Sea Fisheries
(Shellfish) Act 1967 s 7.
While it is readily accepted that any state body which
holds an interest in the seabed or foreshore may have
an obligation to use civil powers based on common
law principles to achieve a result specified by
European or domestic legislation, and the Crown
Estate has felt obliged to act in that way in granting
leases of the seabed or foreshore or rights over them
pending full transposition of European directives, to
the extent that the public right of fishery is exercisable
over such seabed or foreshore there is no potential for
the regulation of fishery through common law actions.
Appleby's discussions of trespass and negligence in
this context, and the implication of an obligation upon
Defra based upon it, are simply inapplicable.
In conclusion, it is not possible to justify Appleby's
view of the limitations of the common law right of
public fishery by reference to the environmental
impacts of fishery techniques, and there is no indication
4 Landelijke Vereniging tot Behoud van de Waddenzee, Nederlandse
Vereniging tot Bescherming van Vogels v Staatssecretaris van Landbouw,
Natuurbeheer en Visserij Case C±127/02 7 September 2004.
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that the lawfulness of any of the techniques discussed
is affected by a concept of `reasonableness', as he
claims. Appleby argues that the public right to fish is
overdue for review, and that the common law basis for
the right should be removed and replaced by a
qualified statutory right.
The abrogation of the common law public right does
present technical difficulties, not least in relation to
some traditional fisheries to which Article 8 of the
European Directive on Human Rights probably applies,
and fisheries in relation to which European legislation
applies. More significantly, the proposition that a
statutory limited right of fishery could be appropri-
ately formulated to cover all times, places, and
techniques appears impossible of achievement.
Reform is certainly required, and has been sought for
many years by the sea fisheries committees and others,
but minimising damage to fragile marine environments
and damage and disturbance to relevant fauna and
flora must be achieved through appropriate manage-
ment systems operating as restrictions on all relevant
activities in the coastal zone (not merely fisheries).
POSTSCRIPT
Isle of Anglesey County Council and Crown Estate
Commissioners v The Welsh Ministers and Others
[2008] EWHC 921 (QB) (Davis J, 6 May 2008)
The interactions between fishing rights (common law
and statutory) and both development and other
environmental controls of the foreshore and fundus
of fisheries came into sharp focus in proceedings
arising from a marina project at Gallows Point at
Beaumaris, Anglesey. While the issues directly concern
the nature of the rights enjoyed under a statutory
several (that is to say, exclusive) fishery, the judgment
turns on an analysis of the nature of the rights enjoyed
under the common law right of public fishery.5
The site is within an area where an order under section
1 of the Sea Fisheries (Shellfish) Act 19676 granted to
North West and North Wales Sea Fisheries Committee
(NWNWSFC) powers not only to regulate/licence the
sea fisheries for certain molluscs but also to create by
lease a several right of fishery to enable particular
areas to be used for on-growing and harvesting. These
rights have been extensively taken up, and as a result
the Menai Strait has become the largest producing
area of mussel culture in the United Kingdom.
The planning application for the marina made by the
claimants in this case, Anglesey County Council
(Anglesey CC) and the Crown Estate, was called in
and recommended for refusal by the inspector in
relation to landscape impacts and impacts on the
mussel fishery; the National Assembly of Wales (NAW)
however gave planning consent. Again, an application
for permission to carry out the works for the marina
below high water mark under section 5 of the Food
and Environmental Protection Act 1985 was recom-
mended for refusal by the Marine Consents and
Environment Unit of Defra in view of the impacts on
the mussel fishery, but NAW again elected to deter-
mine the application, and approved it in April 2006.
Judicial review proceedings had already been insti-
tuted in the Administrative Court in London by the
mussel farmers on the grounds (i) that the deposit (of
dredging for the works for the marina) would be
unlawful because it would involve the Crown Estate
Commissioners in an offence under section 7 of the
1967 Act of damaging the fisheries (ii) that it interfered
with the rights of the fishery (iii) Article 1 of Protocol 1
of the ECHR (iv) irrationality given the environmental
information under Directive 85/337/EEC.7
Further proceedings were instituted by the claimants,
owners of the foreshore and the sea bed out to the 12
mile limit (Anglesey CC and the Crown Estate) to
challenge the validity of the 1962 order, alternatively to
assert that the order was subject to the right of the
owners of soil to carry out development. In the event,
as the licence challenged in the first proceedings was
about to expire, the judgment given on 6 May 2008 by
Davis J was on the second proceedings only.
The judge gave fairly short shrift to arguments that the
grant of a several order to the NWNWSFC was legally
ineffective. In relation to the claim that the order
preserved to Anglesey and the Crown the right to act
in any manner not necessarily consistent with the
grant of a several fishery, the judge inferred that this
would mean that the claimants could, without the
consent of the several fishery, periodically dredge the
entire seabed or extract sand and aggregates, resulting
in the complete destruction of the fishery.
The judge identified the central issue in the proceed-
ings as argued to be in the construction of the 1962
Order, that an owner of foreshore or seabed had no
entitlement to exercise his right of ownership so as
substantially to interfere either with public rights of
navigation or with public rights of fishery. He then
carried out a review of the authorities discussed, and
concluded that the provisions of the 1962 Order which
protected the Crown Estate Commissioners or Anglesey
CC8 reflected the position as it existed prior to the
order being made, where neither claimant had an
5 Davis J stated: `For the avoidance of doubt, [. . ..] in these
proceedings and in this judgment I have not been required to decide,
nor do I decide, whether or not the proposed marina on balance
would or would not be desirable on planning, environmental,
economic or other grounds. My decision is only on the legal issues
raised before me' (judgment para 111).
6 This Act amended and replaced the Sea Fisheries Act 1868. `The
relevant sections for present purposes are contained in Part III of the
1868 Act, and the 1967 Act does of course post-date the 1962 Order'
(judgment para 34).
7 Council Directive 85/337/EEC of 27 June 1985 on the assessment of
the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment
OJ L 175, 5.7.1985.
8 Articles 16 and 18 of the 1962 Order. `Articles 16 and 18, which on
their wording do not confer any greater rights on the Crown Estate
Commissioners or Council than they already had, are to be taken as
reflecting the position, so far as tidal foreshore and seabed are
concerned, which then existed. Accordingly at the time of the 1962
Order no entitlement substantially to interfere with the then public
fishery existed: and no such entitlement with regard to the new
several fishery was created by the 1962 Order' (judgment para 97).
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RESPONSE TO `ANOTHER VIEW OF THE PUBLIC RIGHT TO FISH ± AND
THE QUESTION OF REGULATION OR OWNERSHIP'
TOM APPLEBY
Senior Law Lecturer, Centre for Research for Environmental Studies, University of the West of
England and Visiting Research Fellow, School of Law, University of Bristol
It is undeniable that there is an outer limit on the
appalling mess that is the public right to fish. The
difficult question, which has not been coherently
addressed by the courts in the rag tag and bobtail of
old, first instance and foreign decisions, is where does
that limit lie?
The vagueness and inconsistency of the cases is such
that one can legitimately take a tight view of the
interpretation of the right to fish as have I, or a broad
view as has Scott in his response. Without the matter
being settled in the courts neither of us can be sure
which view is correct. With regard to the specifics
contained in Scott's arguments there are many points
on which, unsurprisingly, I do not agree. For reasons of
space I will only counter a few here.
Whelan v Hewson [1872] IR VI 283 is cited by
Halsbury's Laws of England 10 as authority for a
`reasonable' limit on the public right to fish. Scott is
quite right in saying that nowhere in this case does it
mention reasonableness, but the text may be taken
just to be a restatement of the basic principles of
reasonableness which underpin the common law. Tim
Bonyhady in his remarkable work Law of the Country-
side points out that:
It is likely in fact that the suggestion that the right of
fishing be exercised reasonably is no more than a
restatement of [the prohibition on fixed engines] since
fixed engines can be excessively destructive of fish.11
It remains to be seen whether other excessively
destructive methods are similarly beyond the scope
of the public right to fish.
Scott then goes on to shoot himself in the foot, by
using the analogy of the public right to use the
highway for his broad interpretation of users' rights
under the public right to fish. Rights to use the
highway have been firmly established to be limited to
reasonable use in the case of DPP v Jones [1999] 2 AC
9 `The general position in law seems to be that `̀ all citizens of the
Crown are entitled as a matter of public right to fish in tidal waters
including the high seas, estuaries and tidal watercourses as well as from
the foreshore'': Halsbury's Laws of England (2007 Reissue) Vol.1(2) at
para 800; Malcomson v O'Dea (1863) 10 HL Cas 593' (judgment para 93).
10 Vol 1 (2) 801.
11 T Bonyhady The Laws of the Countryside (Professional Books
Abingdon 1987) p 255.
entitlement substantially to interfere with the then
public fishery, and no such entitlement with regard to
the new several fishery therefore could arise by virtue
of the saving provisions.
The judge continued to identify that because neither
the Crown Estate nor Anglesey CC were `the grantees'
of the order, then they could neither carry out the
works applied for nor grant the right to carry them out,
as these were prohibited acts for all but those named
`grantees' under the Order. He then ultimately con-
cluded that the construction of the marina would
undoubtedly constitute an offence under section 7 (4)
of the 1967 Act.
The judgment therefore is particularly interesting as a
modern application and reaffirmation of the traditional
authorities discussed above,9 and supports the view
that the powers of owners of soil to interfere with and/
or regulate fishing activities through common law action
are very limited. While the judgment is under appeal
to the Court of Appeal with a date of 25 November
2008, given the standing of the older authorities it may
well be that a judgment of the House of Lords could be
required if there is to be a reapportionment of powers
between owners of soil and fishery.
There will in any event need to be a resolution of the
position under which the Crown Estate's consent is
required for the creation of new several fisheries, and
therefore for the achievement of the objectives of the
European Union and the UK government for the
development of molluscan aquaculture. Should the
Crown Estate, in the light of this decision, be minded
to veto new grants because of the potential loss of
commercial development opportunities, the Marine
Bill would appear to allow an opportunity for an
amendment of the 1967 Act to enable a grant to
proceed without Crown Estate consent, and if neces-
sary to enable determination or modification of orders
to facilitate development subject to compensation.
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240. Prior to that case highway users' rights were
construed even more narrowly.12
There is plenty of case law supporting the argument
that injunctions can be obtained to stop rights being
used excessively, such as Peacock v Custins [2001] 2 All
ER 827 and McAdams Homes v Robinson [2005] 1 P&CR
520. These are the bread and butter issues of any
property practice and these decisions have been
rigorously upheld by the courts despite the restric-
tions that this places on land development in the UK
and the knock on economic impacts on the UK
economy. It would involve no great leap of faith to
apply these principles to the disproportionate damage
of inappropriate fishing methods.
To my mind, whether specific methods of fishery are
acceptable is a question of fact and degree. I don't
think that an individual who rocks tables on the mud of
Morecambe Bay can be compared with a high-powered
diesel engine dragging a dredge indiscriminately across
the seabed. Rather than try to describe in words the
action of a dredger on the seabed I have placed some
University of Plymouth footage on the web at: www.
youtube.com/watch?v=gKqM3hXwcRs. Or put scallop
dredge footage into the you tube search engine. I am
afraid if Scott's assertion that scallop dredging `does
not involve the penetration of the gear into the
benthos to anything like the same extent as does
fishing for other species' is true then those other
fishing methods must be truly devastating.
Scott's reference to Article 8 of the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights ± rights to respect for private
and family life ± would have little impact here. As he
correctly points out by his oblique reference in his
discussions about nuisance to the Canadian authority
of Hickey v the Electric Reduction Company of Canada
Limited [1970] 21 DLR (2nd) 368 the commercial sector
is very likely to have no actionable property rights in
the fishery. Such rights as exist `belong' to the general
public. It would therefore be unlikely that there would
be any infringement of Article 1 First Protocol of the
European Convention on Human Rights or the rules of
natural justice, which are more conventionally used to
protect property rights from state interference. Indeed
compensation claims by fishermen may rank as a
subsidy and can raise complex legal issues under
European competition and fisheries law.
Scott's argument that `The proposition that a statutory
limited right of fishery could be appropriately formu-
lated to cover all times and all places and techniques
appears impossible of achievement' is perhaps more
true than he realises. The complex web of EU regula-
tions, ministerial orders, vessel licences and sea fish-
eries committees' byelaws imposing limitations on the
public right to fish, shows that fishery managers are
currently trying to use the approach that Scott so
correctly denigrates. A statutory right limited to
reasonable user within safe environmental limits and
putting responsibility on fishers to use appropriate
gear would at least set the boundaries and stop the
development of fisheries which are obviously harmful
prima facie. It would not even be particularly difficult
to envisage a position where a fishing method had to
be demonstrated to be sustainable before it was
permitted. Far from being the drafting horror antici-
pated by Scott, a limited statutory right would be a
fairly simple exercise. Instead, under Scott's broad
interpretation of the public right to fish, there is a
substantial delay for a damaging fishery to be
regulated in the manner Scott describes by a confusing
number of local, national and international regulators,
by which time the damage has often been done.
Rewriting the public right to fish would have serious
repercussions on the fishing sector and its manage-
ment, but then so perhaps would be a complacent
statement that it would be too difficult. Callum Roberts
in his recent book the The Unnatural History of the Sea
states that:
Extrapolation of current trends suggest that the availability
of fish will fall to about 70% of today's levels by 2050.13
Perhaps Roberts is overstating the case, but the fact
remains there is an unbridled race for fish charged by
weak property rights. It is likely therefore, particularly
given Roberts' role in the Royal Commission on
Environmental Pollution that a court would consider
this science to be sound.
For this reason I do not think my approach has been
partisan, I am merely applying appropriate common
law and commercial principles based on the reason-
able user of a potentially sustainable resource.
Much as I have enjoyed Scott's article and I am very
grateful to him for continuing the discussion on this
important issue, I cannot find that he has provided
anything which alters my view that the public right to
fish is out of control and should be rationalised, so
that it operates on a proper professional basis. Neither
do I think that the courts should feel restricted in their
power to carry out such a rationalisation, if the oppor-
tunity arises. The public right to fish is, after all, a
creature of the common law, so there is no reason why
the common law should not tame it, much as it has
developed tort and contract law. It is understandable
that Scott may wish to propose an alternative view, but
as a commercial lawyer, it must be evident to him that
use of the public right to fish is a very roundabout
and complex method of allocating the commercial
exploitation of a public resource.
Finally, I note that Defra have now banned scallop
dredging in a large part of Lyme Bay, on the basis of the
scientific advice they have received and after a public
consultation. Would it not have been better if the
broad interpretation of the public right to fish had not
allowed the development there of a fishery in such a
contentious manner in the first place?
13 C Roberts The Unnatural History of the Sea (Island Press 2007)
p 318.
12 K Gray, S Gray Elements of Land Law (4th edn, Oxford University
Press) p 325.
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